I
Between 1384 and 1543, a series of personal inhentances brought together under the same ruler a series of principalities and lordships in the Low Countries, which by the end of the period were known as the 'Seventeen Provinces'. The attempt to integrate separate duchies and counties with very different institutional traditions at various stages over this 160-year-long period caused successive Valois and Habsburg rulers considerable problems. The acquisition of new territories often took place in competition with other states, and thus on his initial visit (the so-called joyous entry') the new ruler had to give an undertaking to respect territorial and local Privileges The dukes of Burgundy-followmg both French and Flemish precedents-tned to impose fmancial umformity from above by the creaüon of regional Chambres des Comptes The first was mstalled at Lille in 1386 by Duke Philip the Bold with powers to audit the accounts of officers m Flanders and Artois, and this was later extended to Hamault (1438), Namur and Picardy Directly after his succession to Brabant in 1404, Duke Philip's younger son, mspired by his father, created a Chambre des Comptes for his duchies of Brabant and Limburg, to which Luxembourg was jomed in 1443 In Holland and Zeeland, lt was not until 1447 that a Rekenkamer was mstalled at The Hague (this was abolished in 1463) This delay in imposmg insütutional control should be interpreted in the context of the relatively limited Integration of these two counties withm the Burgundian union At the centre, Duke Philip the Bold (1363-1404) created a recette generale de toutes les finances in 1387, where the accounts of the revenues of the general receivers of Burgundy and Flanders (as well as those of local and specialized receivers) were audited, but the separate accounts were not amalgamated ' Greater speciahzation occurred within the duke's Great Council in 1457 with the creation of a permanent committee competent in all financial matters In 1473, Duke Charles replaced the regional Chambres and created at Malines, together with a Parlement, two central audit offices (one for the domams, the other for the aids) In the upheaval followmg his death in 1477, these three Instruments of potential centrahzation were abolished and the three Chambres des Comptes at Lille, Brüssels and The Hague were re-established After about a Century of evolution, fmancial umfkation had thus generally been accepted at regional level but not for the Low Countnes as a whole It was not until 1531 that a Council of Finance was firmly estabhshed alongside the two other 'collateral Councils', yet even this did not remove diversity m administrative practice Burgundian fiscal admmistration has been studied mtensively by histonans, who have now disproved earlier assumptions of a clear distmction between ' Nieuwenhuysen (1990), 155-60, Biokken and De Schepper (1989) In this chapter, the term States IS taken to mean the representative Institution of a provmce, States General the general representative Institution The sepaiate piovincial coinages of the Burgundian Nelherlands weie not umfitd until 1433-4 Thereaftei, the foimer moneys of the other provmces weie tied in a fixed relationship to the new Burgundian comage, which was (in Di Spufford s words) in effect a continuation of the money of Flanders Thereafter the pondgrool of Flanders always equalled 1 hvre 10 sous of Brabant 6 hvres of Artois, 6 hvres ofl Iolland 12 hvres toumon of Hamault and 12 hvres pansis of Flanders ltself In addition to the pondgrool, and the hvre pansis, there was a third Flemish aecounting System, also based on the groot 1 his was the pound (pond) of 40 groats (grölen) Spufford (J986) , 228 (Edj domam revenue (that IS, the recette ordinaire element in the accounts of the recette genimle des finances) and the aids and other irregulär mcome (the recette extraordinaire element in the accounts) In fact, many receipts fiom aids or loans were accounted for under the ordinaire headmg, while sometimes mcome from domams was to be found under the extraordinaire It seems likely that the receveur general de toutes les finances noted as ordinaire the transfers made by his subordinate officers-the regional receveurs generaux who handled both domams and aids-while the extraordinaire refers to belated payments he did not normally expect This point is important for a correct Interpretation of the sources, but it also pomts to earlier concepts of financial organization which underlie what might otherwise be perceived as irregulanties m the accounts Smce the multiphcity of treasui les at different levels of the State was not elimmated until the end of the ancien regime, it is very difficult to obtam an overall view for the Burgundian penod 3 It is important to recognize that much of the fiscal mcome was disbursed within the provinces themselves and never reached the centre Under Philip the Bold, an average of 55 per cent of the mcome from his vanous temtones reached the centre 4 In Hainault (1427-67), only 53 per cent of domainal mcome and 52 per cent of the aids were transferred to the central recette generale ! Α reconstruction of the total mcome and expenditure of the Burgundian State therefore requires systematic analysis of the accounts in all sectors, levels and regions All receipts have to be pursued as it were 'from the bottom up', and expenditure has to be noted wherever it was mcurred This has only been attempted for certam years, most notably for 1394-6 and 1419
6 The fragmented nature of the accounts, and their lack of systematization, makes this task difficult to achieve for the whole penod The conclusion must be that the dukes themselves could not possibly have had a clear view of their own financial position This verdict is substantiated by the repeated attempts of successive dukes to improve their financial management In 1445, there was a global survey of the annual revenues of Philip the Good from his vanous prmcipalities, the 'charges' (or expenditure in the localities), and the remammg net revenue which in turn was placed agamst the estimate of expenditure mcurred at the centre This exceptional survey confirms that only 54 per cent of the general or gross mcome of the State reached the centre the rest was spent directly m the locality where it was collected-although, it should be stressed, at the express command of the duke himself 7 Charles the Bold (1467-77), whose mterest m administrative reorganization IS well fcnown, had estimates of his revenues drawn up at the very begmnmg of his reign in 1467 This document was far less elaborate than the survey of 1445 and was clearly mtended to be followed by further measures which did not in fact matenalize-the constant mihtary pressures of his reign precluded any thorough reorganization of the financial System 8 Smce successive dukes lacked any overview of their finances, they tended to resort to palliatives for urgent needs and, parücularly in financial cnsis, to vanous types of loans and the assignment of debts 011 specific revenues These methods burdened and complicated the admimstration of finance for contemporanes (as well as creatmg complications for the historian) It was only after the reform of 1531 that budgets were regularly established by the Council of Finance 9
II
Two Systems of taxation coexisted in the Low Countnes for centunes the local taxes for military and other purposes, and general levies which were subdivided as fixed sums to be paid by the vanous localities The first System was older and tended to be most common in rural regions where it had evolved from the domamal tradition Lists of hearths were drawn up for the purpose of the direct taxation of land (comparable to the southem French fonage) these survive for Brabant and Hamault after the mid fourteenth Century and from as early as 1306 for Luxembourg 10 There were comparable Systems in the other prmapahties In the duchy of Guelders, heads of households were registered in the pondschatting, an estimate of total immovable wealth It differed from the hearth censuses elsewhere in that a tax scale was added to the estimated value this ranged fiom 2 to 8 pounds, which suggests a maximum tax rate of 4 per cent " In Holland and Zeeland, repartition lists were based on the compulsory military service each village and town had to perform The number of oarsmen to man the count's koggen was fixed in nemtalen for each distnct, each nem was then converted mto an amount of money, 9 pounds 5 Shillings in the north and 10 pounds in the rest of Holland Likewise, the number of men (schildtalen) for the count's army was fixed for each locality in lists which were regularly revised On the other hand, the construction and mamtenance costs of dikes, dramage canals, sluices and wmdmills were levied by local and regional authorities (waterschappen) in stnct proportion to the area of land owned This System of land taxes per morgen was applicable to the count's aids m exceptional circumstances until the sixteenth Century From 1469 onwards, Charles the Bold attempted to make the census of hearths the basis for the repartition of aids withm his vanous pnncipahties Fiscal equity would prevent tax resistance and undermme the important negotiatmg role of the mam eitles The Chambre des Comptes at Lille was mstructed to compile hearth lists m all the lands withm lts junsdiction, not only m Artois and Hamault, where this merely implied a revision of the existmg System, but also m Flanders and Namur, where lt entailed complete Innovation In Brabant, the hearth lists had been updated as recently as 1464, while in Holland the nemtalen already provided an equally objective equivalent, only Flanders, and especially the areas dommated by Ghent and Bruges, remained a stumblmg-block to the duke's attempt to mtroduce uniform taxation throughout his pnncipalities In 1470, Duke Charles ordered the only hearth list ever undertaken in the pnnce-bishopnc of Liege Similar measures were undertaken in Luxembourg, where Flemish financial experts attempted to modernize the terntory's fiscal organization in 1472 The nobility had to accept for the first time that the general aid would be levied on the population withm their lordships, thus practically doublmg the taxable population-but this lasted for only four years 1J Simultaneously, Duke Charles sought to tax the clergy and nobility withm his terntones, ordermg a sixth penny to be levied on feudal landholdmgs and an amortization on the value of ecclesiastical properties acquired over the previous sixty years This ränge of mnovations aimed to estabhsh a more rational and more equi- 43-7, 376-95, Tracy (1985a) , 84 Α morgen was equivalent to 2 25 acres " Petit (1985) , 408-14, Petit (1993 ), 137-8 14 Amould (1956 ), 159-61 Blockmans (1978 ) 416-21, Blockmans (1987 ), 79-82, Jongkeei, (1942 15 Maddens (1978 ), 189-204, Zoete (J994), chs 5, 6, 8, 11, Petit (1993 institutions, especially in the most urbanized prmcipalities, in part explams the repeated failure of government attempts to establish a uniform System of taxation for the Burgundian lands as a whole There were certamly attempts to mtroduce a simpler method of collectmg revenues in 1438, Philip the Good proposed the levy of 1 noble on each sack of wool imported mto Flanders at Gravelmes This Innovation was later extended to all goods passmg this border toll in both directions 16 In 1445, the yield of this tax was in excess of 13,000 hvres (of 40 groats), far more than the gross revenue of the domains in the county of Namur, which amounted to 8,080 hvres " As a result of considerable populär pressure, the government had to relmquish this toll in 1477 Philip the Good's proposal in 1447 for a variable levy on salt in Flanders, 18 subsequently extended to the other prmcipalities, was less successful Ghent common Council 1 s categoncal refusal to impose this levy led to a protracted conflict between the duke and his largest city, but violent resistance was effective no gabeile was ever mtroduced in the Low Countnes 19 The great eitles resisted the imposition of permanent indirect taxation because they wished to retarn control over the grant of taxes, the conditions imposed, and the repartition and levy of the subsequent tax revenue They were prepared to avoid such initiatives by the grant of large aids which were possibly even more burdensome to the population at large than the proposed indirect 20 taxes Even m the sixteenth Century, the States remained opposed to any long-term grant of indirect taxes on consumption, trade or property The eitles of Holland struggled fiercely agamst repeated attempts to levy a tax on gram exports On five occasions between 1506 and 1545, the central government tned to impose such a Longie or licence, but each time lt had to be withdrawn after a few months In Zeeland, Brabant and Flanders, there was less obstruction, probably because these provinces were less dependent on the transit gram trade Between 24 April 1535 and 28 February 1541, the tax yielded the relatively modest sum of 22,280 pounds " The dramatic and pressing mcrease in the government's financial requirements dunng the penods of war with France forced lt to consider lmplementing new Systems of taxation Since the Opposition of the States General and the provincial assemblies always tended to delay the Implementation of new fiscal measures, the government had to adopt expedients with far-reachmg 16 Thielemans (1966 ), 175-6, Blockmans (1978 Arnould (1974), 151-2, 214
The levy was of 18 or 27 groals pei sack of salt 19 Vaughan (1970 ), 303-30, Boone (1990b Blockmans (1978 Blockmans ( ), 378-439, (1988 Tracy (1990), [94] [95] [96] [97] [98] [99] [100] [101] [102] [103] [104] [105] significance m terms of mterference with the States From 1542 onwards, several mdirect taxes were granted for predetermined penods to finance the war agamst France a tax of 'the xooth penny' on the value of exports, after protracted negotiations with the States, was finally imposed 'by virtue of the Emperor's absolute power', a tax of'the loth penny' on commercial profits and on mcome from landed property (mcludmg rents) was also imposed The tax on real property and rents proved the most advantageous of the three to the central govern ment it yielded 290,000 hvres in Flanders, 248,933 hvres in Brabant and 91,482 pounds in Holland The levy on commercial profits met such strong Opposition that it yielded only 1,200 pounds in Holland, and the export tax had to be extended by more than two years in Order to bring in the 200,000 pounds for which lts collection had been farmed out Dunng the years 1542-4, which saw extremely high fiscal pressure, half the revenues of the province of Holland came from mdirect taxes and from the sale of rents funded by the States Although after 1545 universal taxes were not levied on exports and commercial profits until Alba's regime, provmcial excises con trolled by the States became a regulär feature By complying with Alba's 'novel expedients', the States expanded the responsibihties of their own collectors 22 Alba's attempt in 1569 to mtroduce three different universal taxes (at levels of 1, 5 and 10 per cent) failed because of the obstructiomsm of the provmces, and this helped to mobilize public opimon agamst the government dunng the revolt in the Low Countnes
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The second System of taxation used in the Low Countnes, by repartition m abstract figures mstead of troops, was first developed in Flanders The earliest list covenng the whole country was drawn up in 1305 for towns and rural districts It was revised m 1408, partly revised in 1474 and completely revised again in 1517, but lts application always remained a matter of negotiation 4 The most important eitles were usually able to obtain considerable reductions Since the repartition lists were not derived from objective economic data, they could easily be mampulated Between 1515 and 1550, the three main eitles of FlandersGhent, Bruges and Ypres-contnbuted on average a mere 8 per cent to the aids of the country, while they were theoretically charged at 35 5 per cent 25 The mtroducüon of such a repartition System in Holland came only with the accession of the house of Valois in 1427, while this Innovation did not reach Utrecht 11 Tracy (1985a ), 79-91, Arnould (1956 ) 15-18, Maddens (1979 23 Ciaeybeckx (1967) , Grapperhaus (1982) The broader context of these taxes IS descnbed by
Muto in Bonney (1995), ch 7 24 Preveruer (i960), Buntinx (1968) , Maddens (1978 ), 13-72 " Maddens (1978 , 216-46 (present aulhor s calculations), Boone (1990a ), 53-60, Blockmans (1978 , 42·5-32 and Guelders until 1500 From 1526 onwards, the five great cities of Holland (with the exception of Amsterdam) had rebates of between 66 and 80 per cent of the ordmary aids, and of between γγ and 100 per cent of the extraordmary aids, which they obtamed by tradmg their consent Yet the 1514-15 assessment in Holland mdicates that the cities represented 59 4 per cent of the total wealth of the province In 1531, the Council of Finance estimated that the graces accorded by such negotiations reduced the net revenue of the aids by 35 per cent in Holland, 33 per cent m Brabant and 32 per cent in Flanders It was pnmanly the mhabitants of the large cities who profited from these reductions The figures show that urban wealth, and especially commercial capital, was taxed with great indulgence under the Valois and Habsburgs
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In 1470, as part of his attempt to establish greater umformity of taxation methods in his terntones, Duke Charles first proposed to levy an aid on all his prmcipalities in the Low Countnes, assembled in the States General It was only in 1473 that the first general aid was granted, since the repartition between the terntones had posed diffkulties because of the Opposition to a general census of hearths Although the repartition applied on that occasion was repeated for several later grants, vanations contmued to occur at later dates (Figure 8 1 and  Table 8 1) " The initial aim of achievmg greater effectiveness by asking for aids from all the terntones at the same time proved unrealistic negotiations contmued to be conducted on a province-by provmce basis After 1523, mdeed, the proposed grantmg of aids was rarely suggested to the States General, and attempts at umfication were largely abandoned The pressing fiscal needs of the government forced it to yield to sectional demands from the vanous terntones and from mterest groups withm the provmces III It is only for a relatively small number of years that we can compare the different types of mcome and expenditure in the Burgundian and Habsburg terntones Figure 8 2 and Table 8 2 show the position for mcome in the years 1394-6, when the Burgundian State was still small but takmg huge profits from the French crown 28 The diversity in accountmg methods applied in the vanous pnncipali ties renders comparison somewhat difncult For example, the receivers for Flanders, Lille and Limburg made no mention of ordmary aids, which Bos Rops (1993 ), 236-7, Tracy (1985b 27 ESFDB \block\nethbooi based on \nethdooi, Blockmans (1978 ), 421-3, Zoete (1994 represented quite sigmficant amounts in the other terntones, exceedmg by far the 'aids for the duke' In Burgundy, for example, the former aecounted for 50,000 fiancs, the latter merely for 21,000 fiancs, while m Flanders similar revenues were considered to form part of the domain Α signifkant proportion (about 12 5 per cent) of the Flemish domamal revenues was drawn from tolls levied on the international trade through the ports and along the nvers If we also mclude the mcome of the duke from seigmorage nghts from royal mints, levies on 'Lombards' and other moneylenders and a share in urban assizes The Low Countnes m the Mxddle Ages 291 (which were all higher in a commercialized than a rural region), the Flemish domamal revenues amounted in 1401-2 to around 22,000 ecus Z9 This example shows the dangers of identifying the domam in all terntones as merely the traditional, mainly rural, revenue of the pnnce Pensions from the French crown were of critical importance in the total revenues for the year 1419, although lt was to be the last time that this was the case (Figure 8 3 and Table 8 3) Ducal revenues had decreased substantially since 1394-6 The domains and aids yielded some 40 per cent less as a consequence of territorial concessions to two junior branches of the dynasty Champagne, Niveinais, Rethel, Antwerp and Limburg had all passed into other hands, which meant a reduction in total revenue of neaily 15 per cent Furthermore, the revenue from aids in Burgundy-which had been extraordinanly high in 1394-6 -decreased by two thirds, while the Flemish domains yielded 29 per cent less, mainly due to charges on the revenues These losses were compensated for m part by the huge flow of pensions from the French royal treasury and revenues from ducal mintage nghts, which had more than quadrupled (the domam re ceipts for Burgundy amounted to some 191,000 hvres in seigniorage nghts from royal mints) these two elements now represented almost two thnds of the duke's total income Matnmomal and inhentance arrangements thus had dramaüc consequences for the Burgundian State Moreovei, the emphasis on French pohtics and seeking pensions from the Valois lang under John the Fear less (1404-19) led to the neglect of regulai sources of income at home and rendered the State s finances extremely vulnerable 30 After his murder in 1419, and the immediate stop on further income from the French king, his son Philip the Good (1419-67) had no other choice but to try to expand his terntones once again He was eventually remaikably successful in this task The estimate of income foi 1445 (Figuie 8 4 and Table 8 4)" and the budget foi 1467, both studied by Arnould, allow us an insight into the fully developed and financially independent Burgundian State The net receipts of the duke s do mains on average amounted to 54 1 per cent of the gross income, with the domains of Aitois, Flanders and Holland charged most heavily with assign ments Both the estimate of income for 1445 and the budget foi 1467 chiefly concern the domains, we can contrast this income with the receipts from the aids granted in 1445 or, somewhat earlier, for all the duke's terntones, since they were motivated by the conquest of the duchy of Luxembourg Moreover, we 2 Nieuwenhuysen (1984) where domamal mcome remamed sigmficantly high In the two Burgundies, the aids represented merely 18 per cent of the relatively high domamal (gross) revenue, while in Brabant the aids amounted to 45 per cent more than the total of the receipts from the domams These dispanties need to be considered in relation to the extent and strueture of the duke's domams in each component territory
The gross revenues from the domams and the aids m 1445 amounted to about 512,000 pounds of 40 groats or nearly 16 7 metne tonnes of fine silver 33 By 1465, the mcome from aids had mereased by 30 per cent, equivalent to about 8 metne tonnes of fine silver which, together with the equivalent of more than 10 3 metne tonnes of fine silver ansmg from the gross domamal revenues, amounted to a total of some 18 metne tonnes This figure compared favourably with the revenues of Edward IV of England in the same penod, as well as with the equivalent of 10 metne tonnes in silver granted as sernews by the Cortes of Castile u The financial potential of the Burgundian State made lt a true competi tor with the main kmgdoms of western Europe, although lts population was far less numerous Figure 8 5 reveals clearly the financial predominance of Flanders, with more than double the revenue of neighbourmg pnncrpalities such as BrabantLimburg, Holland-Zeeland and Artois Hamault's relatively modest contnbution was a consequence of the great political importance of lts nobility, smee the large noble domams weie exempt from the tax demands of the Valois dukes " 1 groat contained 0 8:43 giammes of fine silver in 1445 Fiom 1434 to 1465, a Flemish groat weighed 1 7 grammes and had a punty of 0 479 Gelder and Hoc (i960) Even more striking IS the per capita tax bürden (though lt must be recognized that the population figures have to be computed from fiscal data and thus are liable to the same bias) With the exception of Hainault, lt appears that the tax bürden was considerably heavier in the rural regions than in the cities The case of Namur Stands out as being unusually high even lf one removes the unique aid of 1444 (6,000 hvres), the per capita bürden of the duke's domamal mcome in that county was still 17 groats, as compared to figures of 7 groats or below elsewhere These figures obviously ignore other taxes levied by feudal loids, eines and dramage orgamzations, but the mescapable conclusion is that the per capita tax bürden weighed up to twice as heavily on the mhabitant of a rural region than on his counterpart in an urbanized region
The budget of 1467 seems to confirm the tendency for the aids to be lower when domamal revenue was high, and vice versa (Figure 8 6 and Table 8 6) 35 Brabant and Holland had low domamal revenue but a high mcome from the aids, Artois and Picardy showed the reverse tendency In general, total mcome from the domain had nsen markedly dunng this, the 'golden age' of Burgundy There had also been a dnve to reduce the charges on the receipt offices, espe- The net domain figure for 1445 was 170 933 The increase was therefore 324% on this figure L C Low Countnes txeluding Burgundy and Luxembourg Source Arnould (1984 ) 247 Blockmans (1978 636 Maddens (1978) 7 aally in Artois In the first half of the sixteenth Century, the contribution of the domains dechned to a quarter of total revenues in 'normal' years such as 1534 and 1551, and to a mere 5 per cent in the cnsis year of 1545 (Figure 8 7 and Table 8 7) In general, Charles V considered his domains an essential seeunty for his extensive wartime loans The increase in gram pnees and rents (which doubled between 1505 and 1550) created a buoyant domamal revenue and helped to guarantee the fJoatmg debt Territorial expansion thus enabled the duke to follow a policy of independence from France, which could not apply before 1419, and from England, which became apparent in 1435. Figure 8 .8 and Table 8 .8 38 suggest that the year 1419 had been one of extremely low returns for the duke's regulär mcome from domains and aids, even if the figure for the aids in Burgundy and for the Flemish domain revenues in 1394-6 seem unusually high (the overall fall in income in 1419 was mainly owmg to reductions in these two items). The proportion of the income from the aids fluctuated between 38.1 per cent in 1394-6, 31.4 per cent in 1419 and 32.8 per cent in 1445; this drop has been related to the Parisian onentation (and income Supplements) of Duke John the Fearless. The other items of income showed a remarkable stability over the half-century, 39 which contrasts sharply with their evolution durmg the next Century.
The global figures of aids granted by the States during the fifteenth and Zoete (1994) 338 Nieuwenhuysen (1990) sixteenth centunes are available for most of the Burgundian temtories These figures are summanzed for the years 1405-67 in Figure 8 9 m Recent detailed research has been undertaken for Flanders, Luxembourg, Guelders and Holland In several terntones, especially Holland, Zeeland, Brabant and Artois, there was an mereasmg stability in the amount of aids granted, and a tendency for them to be agreed for several years in advance This was also the practice in Flanders, but lt was complicated by the addition of several grants of different sizes and for different timescales these mcluded ecclesiastical grants and huge fines imposed after unsuccessful revolts (in 1430, 1438 and 1453) In Hamault, there were regulär grants from 1445 onwards, and this year was a turmng-pomt in the financial history of the Burgundian State in other respects as well In view 40 ESFDB \block\nethgooi based on \nethdoio, Zoete (1994) of the irregulanty of the duke's grants of aids in Flanders, lt IS not surpnsing that he made great efforts to obtam more reliable revenue from other sources such as tolls and the proposed tax on salt Figure 8 io 41 shows that actual revenue from the aids oscillated between the gross and the net domam mcome at their 1445 levels Tax levels clearly mcreased during penods of war (such as 1473-93 and 1520-9), but tax revenue never feil back to lts pre war levels (Figures 8 11 and 8 12) " 2 Remarkably, the annual average of revenue from aids in all the terntones feil from 248,665 hvres in 1430-3 to 211,817 hvres m 1444-67, a decrease of 14 8 per cent The chromcler Philippe de Commynes observed correctly that Philip the Good 'tailloit peu ses subjets' The years between 1444 and 1467 mdeed represent a 'golden age' of Burgundy in which the Standard of Irving rose generally to a peak unequalled until the late mneteenth Century 43 Even so, there were sigmficant differences in the average grant of aids between the different terntones 44 While acceptmg that Burgundy and Zeeland may mitially have been overburdened, the gentle fiscal treatment of Brabant and Limburg, as compared with the " ESFDB \block\nethg002 based on \nethdon, Zoete (1994) 4Z ESFDB \block\nethg003 based on \nethd012 Blockmans (1978), Maddens (1978) , recalculated, ESFDB \bl0ck\nethg004 based on \nethd012 and \nethd013 43 Uytven (1961b) 
V
Although the Burgundian and Habsburg rulers in the Low Countnes mtroduced new finanaal mstitutions (especially the Chambres des Comptes) which sought to control subordmate authonties and officers, their finanaal System remamed far from mtegrated and centralized They repeatedly attempted, but failed, to mtroduce a fair scheme of repartition withm their terntones They also failed in their attempts to mtroduce permanent taxes on consumables and/or property They did not secure control of their own domamal revenue, smce local expenditure dramed off almost half of lt at source It IS clear that, after a penod in which the mstitutional structure was strengthened, the central admmistration was on the retreat dunng the penods of external and mternal war (1475-93, 152.1-4, 1542-4 and 1552-9) An important symptom of the failure of the central admmistration to meet lts own goals was the widespread practice of venality of office, which resulted from an mcreasmg bürden of debt placed on particular offices 48 Vanous forms of corruption also eroded the hierarchy from withm 49 The government 47 Mai silje (1988) "" Bos Rops (1993), 3Ι9-3Γ * Blockmans (1988), Boone and Brand (1991) was forced to make regulär concessions to claims from lts subjects which weak ened lts financial control The strength of the mtermediary powers, espeaally the great eines (and feudal lords in areas such as Hamault, Luxembourg and Guelders) impeded the development of the powers of the State The cities took advantage of the lack of objeetive Information for the measurement of taxable wealth, and in particular they prevented the taxation of foreign trade and commercial capital Yet the urbamzed 'core' provmces were clearly capable of sustammg sudden large increases in the bürden of taxes and loans The overall merease m taxation-from 0 5 million hvres in 1445 to 1 2 million hvres in 1531-and of the debt-which from 1538 onwards stabilized at about 1 4 million hvres, but which then rose to 7 million hvres in 1555-was mamly supported by the three 'core' provmces of Flanders, Brabant and Hol land They, and especially Brabant and Holland after the 1480s, were the most densely populated, urbamzed and commercialized provmces Between 1445 and 1471, the shaie of the aids granted by these three provmces rose fiom just over a half to about three quarters of the total in the Low Countnes, and lt remamed at this level even after Charles V's territorial acquisitions Durmg the war years 1535-8, the share of these provmces peaked at 86 per cent of total taxation However important territorial expansion may have been to prmees, the growth of the 'tax State' rested increasingly on the 'core' provmces, even lf in other respects these provmces contiolled much of the state's resources
The immense Variation between the terntones within the relatively small aiea of the Low Countnes IS not merely to be explamed by different levels of urbanization and commercialization The rulers and their advisers were only vaguely aware of their terntones' fiscal potential this led to a relatively low bürden in Hamault and an extremely high one m Holland, while in other regions the level of the aids compensated for a low income from the domams The political mfluence of the States, and especially of the large cities, prevented the füll Implementation (and thus the success) of most of the government's schemes for establishmg a more 1 ational tax strueture in the late medieval penod It was not unül Alba s regime (1567-73) that there was a sustained attempt at fiscal Innovation in the Low Countnes The widespread resistance provoked by these measures helped to broaden and deepen the revolt against Philip II's authonty which eventually destroyed the Burgundian State that had been so pamstakingly construeted in the later Middle Ages 
